UFO File #6 – Incidentul NIMITZ (Tic-Tac)





 

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FILE #6: NIMITZ TIC-TAC ENCOUNTER

DOCUMENT: USS NIMITZ AAV ENCOUNTER REPORT
DATE: NOVEMBER 14, 2004
UNIT: USS PRINCETON (CG-59) // STRIKE FIGHTER SQUADRON VFA-41
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EVIDENCE LOG

  • Visual: 40-foot white "Tic-Tac" shaped object with no flight surfaces.
  • Propulsion: No visible wings, rotors, or exhaust plumes detected.
  • Radar: Tracked on SPY-1B descending from 80k ft to sea level.
  • Performance: Instantaneous acceleration to hypersonic speeds.
ANALYSIS: "THE OBJECT WAS REACTING TO OUR MOVEMENTS." // DECLASSIFIED DATA

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